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sexual acts. the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland has clearly stated that no such
right exists for the sexual acts of consenting, unmarried, heterosexual adults.
According to the court, the right to
privacy for sexual acts applies only to married adults.

- Leo]. Keenan, III

Niroo v. Niroo:
ANTICIPATED RENEWAL
COMMISSIONS ON INSURANCE
POLICIES SOLD BY A SPOUSE

DURING TIlE MARRIAGE ARE
MARITAL PROPERTY
In Niroo v. Niroo, 313 Md. 226, 545 A.2d
35 (1988), the Court of Appeals of
Maryland held that anticipated renewal
commissions on insurance policies sold by
a spouse during the marriage but accruing
after the marriage are marital property
within the meaning of the Property Disposition in Divorce Annulment Act (the
Act), Md. Fam. Law Code Ann. §8-201(e)
(1984).
The Niroos were married in 1977. In
1978, Mr. Niroo became an insurance
salesman for Pennsylvania Life Insurance
Company (penn Life), where he received
commissions on individual policies sold. In
1980, he entered into agency manager
agreements with Penn Life and the Executive Fund Life Insurance Company. Under
these agreements, Mr. Niroo shared in the
profits and the losses of the company. The
agreements entitled him to receive income
derived from net profits generated from
the renewal of insurance policies. Furthermore, the contracts specified that the husband's right to these renewal commissions
"shall be vested in him even if he is permanently and totally disabled, or after his
death in his heirs and assigns." 313 Md. at
229, 545 A.2d at 36.
At trial, Mr. Niroo contended that the
commissions were not marital property as
defined by the Act. Alternatively, he contended that if the commissions were deemed marital property, then the value of the
commissions were offset by advances he
had drawn against future commissions
which should properly have been construed as marital property. The trial judge
disagreed on both counts, holding the
commissions were marital property and
that the debt he had incurred could not be
offset against the commissions. The court
awarded Mrs. Niroo a $200,000 monetary
award.Id. at 229-30, 545 A.2d at 37.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland
granted certiorari in this case prior to the

case's consideration by the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland in order to "consider the important question involved in
this case." Id. at 230, 545 A.2d at 37. On
appeal, Mr. Niroo asserted that the "speculative and contingent nature of these
commissions" rendered him a tenuous
property interest which was not within
the definition of marital property as contemplated by the legislature in section 8201(e). Id. at 232, 545 A.2d at 38. Because
he had to "work" these accounts through
activities which would take place after the
marriage was dissolved, Mr. Niroo argued
that the commissions were not "acquired"
during the marriage. He therefore contended that "the classification of renewal
commissions as marital property would
improperly give his former wife the fruits
of his future efforts and would penalize
him if the renewal commissions were not
realized." Id.
The court of appeals did not agree, and
it affirmed the holding of the trial court
that the commissions were marital property. It reiterated its conclusion that the Act
significantly changed traditional notions
of property rights between spouses and
broadened the concept of marital property.Id. at 229, 545 A.2d at 37. Marital property may be "'construed to include
obligations, rights and other intangibles as
well as physical things.'" Id. at 233, 545
A.2d at 38 (quoting Bouse v. Hutzler, 180
Md. 682, 686, 26 A.2d 767, (1942». The
proper analysis to determine marital property was, "first, to decide whether the
property right was acquired during the
marriage and second, whether it is equitable to include it as marital property,
without regard to whether the right is
vested or not." Niroo at 233, 545 A.2d at
38-39 (citing Deering v. Deering, 292 Md.
115, 437 A.2d 883 (1981». Despite Mr.
Niroo's claim that after the dissolution of
the marriage he must still "service" these
accounts in order to realize the renewal
commissions, the court held that "[t]he
husband's primary effort was expended in
acquiring the original policies." Niroo at
235, 545 A.2d at 40. Furthermore, the
court of appeals referred to the evidence
presented at trial which showed that the
commissions were not found to be speculative. Evidence showed that "72% of
existing policies will be automatically
renewed after the first year; 82% ... the
second year; and 88% will be renewed
thereafter." Id. Thus, the court held that
the property right to these commissions
was manifestly vested during the marriage,
and was, therefore, enforceable as marital
property.
Moreover, the court of appeals stated
that it was settled that an insurance agent

has a vested right in renewal commissions.
Id. at 234-35,545 A.2d at 39 (citing Travelers Ins. Co. v. Hermann, 154 Md. 171, 185,
140 A. 64 (1928». Thus, "contractually
vested rights in renewal commissions are a
type of property interest within the definition of marital property under section 8201(e)." Niroo at 234, 545 A.2d at 39. This
right was established in Mr. Niroo's agency contract with Penn Life, which provided that should he "die or become disabled,
his right to receive the renewal commissions, as well as his heirs' rights thereto,
would not be affected." Id. at 235, 545
A.2d at 39. The court reasoned that
because the husband had a vested right in
the commissions, they were a valuable
asset "not separable from the original policies sold during the marriage, and thus
properly a part of the couple's shared
assets during the marriage." Id. at 237,545
A.2d at 40.
Although the court of appeals noted that
the Act expanded the concept of marital
property, the court did note that some
rights and interests were not includable as
marital property. Among these are an
inchoate personal injury claim arising
from an accident during the marriage,
which it considered as so "uniquely personal that it could not be considered marital property 'acquired' during the marriage
..•. " Id. at 234, 545 A.2d at 39. Also
excluded from the definition of marital
property was a medical degree or license,
which the court considered a "mere
expectancy of future enhanced income ...
personal to the holder [and] cannot be
transferred, pledged or inherited." Archer
v. Archer, 303 Md. 347,357,493 A.2d 1074
(1985). Despite Mr. Niroo's contention
that the renewal commissions were so
uniquely personal as to disqualify them as
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"marital propeny" under the statute, the
court did not agree. Niroo at 237, 545 A.2d
at 40.
Alternatively, Mr. Niroo aruged that the
trial coun erred in not finding that cenain
debt that he incurred - advances received
in the form of a loan from Penn Life should have been construed as marital
debt, and thus offset against the present
value of the commissions. This would possibly have had the effect of reducing Mrs.
Niroo's monetary award. Although the
court did not agree with Mr. Niroo's calculations, it did agree that the advances
were marital debts and should be offset
against the commissions. Subsequently,
the case was remanded for funher consideration in determining the proper monetary award.
The Niroo coun is splitting judicial hairs
on the definition of marital propeny. It
has determined that the rights to renewal
commissions that vested during the marriage are contractual rights and are, therefore, enforceable as a propeny right rather
than as a mere conditional expectation.
The distinction to be made is that the
court refused to recognize as marital property earnings which were speculative and
nontransferable, such as a medical degree
or license; yet determined that the right to
future earnings that vested during the
marriage were marital property because
they were less speculative and were
transferable.

- Peter T. McDowell

Craig 'V. State: SIXTH AMENDMENT
RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION IS
NOT ABSOLUTE IN Clflm ABUSE

CASES
In Craig v. State, 76 Md. App. 250, 544
A.2d 784 (1988), the Coun of Special
Appeals of Maryland held that the
Maryland statute that allows alleged child
abuse victims to testify over closed circuit
television, if it is determined that testifying
in the courtroom will so traumatize the
child-witness that the child will be unable
to reasonably communicate, does not violate the six amendment's confrontation
clause.
Sandra Ann Craig was the owner and
operator of a pre-kindergarten and kindergarten school in Howard County. Brooke
Etze attended Craig's school for two years,
had never complained to her parents of
any abusive treatment, and her parents had
ex:pressed satisfaction with Craig and her
school. After reading a newspaper account
of complaints of abuse at Craig's school,

Mr. and Mrs. Etze attended a meeting
hosted by Howard County's social services and health departments. As a result of
what they learned at the meeting, the
Etze's had Brooke evaluated by a therapist.
During conversations with the therapist
and her parents, Brooke disclosed several
incidents of abuse committed by Craig,
two of Craig's children, and other children
at the school. It was revealed that "[t]he
direct abuse by Ms. Craig included kicking
Brooke on the legs and in her 'private
parts,' inserting a stick in her vagina, and
threatening her with the loss of her
parents' love." A medical examination
confirmed sexual abuse. Id. at 255, 544
A.2d at 786.
Ultimately, a six-count indictment was
returned in the Circuit Court for Howard
County against Sandra Craig, who was
tried and convicted of all counts in a jury
trial. Craig appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, raising seven
issues. The court of special appeals found
no merit in any of the complaints and
affirmed the conviction. This article
addresses Craig's complaint that "the
coun erred in allowing the children to testify on closed circuit television" in violation
of
the
sixth
amendment's
confrontation clause. Id. at 257, 544 A.2d
at 786.
The trial coun applied section 9-102 of
the Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings Code in allowing Brooke and several
other children to testify during the trial
through closed circuit television. Md. Cts.
& Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 9-102 (1984).
Section 9-102 provides that in a case of
child abuse, the coun may allow a child's
testimony taken outside the counroom in
a child abuse trial if "(i) the testimony is
taken during the proceeding and (ii) the
judge determines that the child testifying
in the counroom will result in the child
suffering serious emotional distress such
that the child cannot reasonably communicate." Id. at 275, 544 A.2d at 786. Craig's
complaint was in effect a three-part issue.
She contended that section 9-102 "violate[d] her Constitutional right of confrontation; (2) the coun failed to follow the
proper procedure in concluding that the
children would suffer serious emotional
distress such that they would be unable to
reasonably communicate if required to testify in coun; and (3) '" § 9-102 ... violated her right of presence." Id.
The Craig trial court did not have the
benefit of an appellate decision concerning
the construction of section 9-102. Consequently, the main thrust of Craig's attack
focused on Wildermuth v. State, 310 Md.
496, 530 A.2d 275 (1987), which was decided after her verdicts were rendered.

Wildermuth concerned a challenge that the
procedure stated in section 9-102 contravened a defendant's right of confrontation
and presence. However, subsequent to
Wildermuth, the U.S. Supreme Coun
decided Coy v. Iowa, __ U.S. __,108
S. Ct. 2798 (1988), which also "addressed
the confrontation issues raised by pr~
dures impairing face-to-face contact
between child-witnesses and defendants on
trial for having allegedly abused them." 76
Md. App. at 275-76, 544 A.2d at 796.
In Coy, the defendant was charged with
having assaulted two 13-year old girls. The
trial judge, without inquiring whether the
assaulted children would be able to testify
in Coy's presence and acting pursuant to a
recently enacted state statute, permitted a
semi-opaque screen to be placed in the
courtroom between the witness stand and
Coy. Coy was able to dimly see the
witnesses but the witnesses were not able
to see him. The state had sought to justify
the procedure on the ground that there
was a legislatively imposed presumption of
trauma, thereby avoiding a specific finding
of necessity for separating the victims
from the defendant. The state also argued
that there was no violation of Coy's right
to confrontation since his right of crossexamination was left intact. Id.
Justice Scalia authored the Supreme
Court's majority decision that rejected the
state's two arguments. The Court held that
the right of confrontation required more
than just the ability to cross-examine but
also included the right to meet one's accuser face-to-face. Additionally, the Coun
rejected the state's contention that its statute could, on its own, supply the necessity, and stressed the lack of individualized
findings. Nevertheless, the Court did not
completely rule out exceptions to this finding, but simply stated that the question of
whether any exceptions may exist would
have to wait for another day. Id. at 27&-77,
544 A.2d at 797. In the concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor made clear, however, that the face-to-face confrontation
requirement was "not absolute but rather
may give way ... to other competing
interests so as to permit the use of certain
procedural devices to shield a child witness
from the trauma of courtroom testimony." Id. at 278, 544 A.2d at 797-98
(quoting Coy, __ U.S. at - > 108 S. Ct.
at 2803).
The Craig court concluded that the Coy
Court did not firmly rule out exceptions
to the face-to-face confrontation clause
requirement nor did it rule out as an exception a state's interest in protecting childwitnesses from being traumatized while
testifying in a courtroom in the presence of
the defendant. The court noted that, even
though Justice Scalia's opinion may have
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